Re D (Adoption: Notification of Husband and Relatives) [2026] EWHC 1289 (Fam)
In adoption proceedings, the local authority made an application to withhold notice of the intention to place a child for adoption (the Part 19 application) under FPR 14.21 and an application (a C66 application) under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to withhold notice from extended family members. The court emphasised that it was not a “rubber stamp” notwithstanding the parties’ agreement.
Facts
D was born in late 2025 and was six months old at the time of the proceedings.
The mother moved to the UK from Country Z. She was raised in a rural community in Country Z in a household with limited resources. She left school at 18 and entered employment, where she met her husband. The court described the marriage as a love match.
The mother participated in protests against the government of Country Z, which brought her to the attention of the police. In 2023 she was arrested and detained for three days. During her detention, she was raped on more than one occasion by officials. Her family paid a bribe to secure her release.
Following her release, the mother borrowed a substantial sum to leave Country Z. She travelled to the UK via a third country, arriving in early 2024. She was granted refugee status in 2025. Although she obtained employment in the UK, she had lost her job by the time of the hearing and her financial circumstances were precarious. The mother’s support network in the UK was limited to her husband’s brother who provided occasional assistance. The mother had leave/asylum with recourse to public funds. The judgment noted that D had no immigration status/the mother’s nationality because the embassy had not been notified, and that adoption in England would confer British citizenship via the adopters.
In 2025 the mother attended a house party where she believes she was drugged. The mother became drowsy and unwell. She woke up in the morning with no memory of what had happened. Some months later, the mother took a pregnancy test and found out that she was pregnant. She concealed her pregnancy from her family and husband. Because she has no memory of the party, the mother does not know who the father is.
The mother did not receive antenatal care but in any event D was born and was admitted briefly to the neonatal unit for suspected sepsis, treated promptly with no lasting effects. The mother immediately consented to her being placed in foster care where D has thrived. D was accommodated under s.20 Children Act 1989 from birth and placed in an early permanence placement with carers who wished to adopt. The mother signed consents under ss.19 and 20 Adoption and Children Act 2002. Contact between the mother and D continued. The mother sought to place D for adoption without the father or extended family being notified.
The Legal Framework
The case quoted heavily from Lord Justice Peter Jackson’s decision in Re A, B & C [2020] EWCA Civ 41 and quoted the full test which is outlined at paragraph 89 which includes an explanation of the factors listed below.
(1) Parental responsibility.
(2) Article 8 rights.
(3) The substance of the relationships.
(4) The likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption.
(5) The physical, psychological or social impact on the mother or on others of notification being given.
(6) Cultural and religious factors.
(7) The availability and durability of the confidential information.
(8) The impact of delay.
(9) Any other relevant matters.
The court noted that notification is discretionary and that, while D’s welfare is important, it is not the paramount consideration in the notification decision.
One significant legal issue in this case was whether the mother’s husband has parental responsibility. The parties had proceeded on the basis that the mother’s husband did not have parental responsibility because it was accepted he was not the biological father. The court did not agree.
Section 2(1) of the Children Act 1989 states that (1) Where a child’s father and mother were married to…each other at the time of his birth, they shall each have parental responsibility for the child. On this basis, the court held that he currently has parental responsibility despite the evidence that he was not the father. The court did not determine how this matter should be dealt with before any final adoption order but helpfully pointed out that once the issue of notification had been dealt with the parties had two options. Firstly, the court could make a Declaration of Non-parentage under s.55A of the Family Law Act 1986 before any final adoption order is made. Alternatively, the court could dispense with the father’s consent to adoption under s.52(1)(b) ACA 2002.
The Court’s Analysis
The court considered the relevant persons separately, addressing in turn the biological father, the mother’s husband, and the wider family.
The issue of the biological father was dealt with briefly. The court concluded that the mother does not know the father’s identity and, given that there were numerous males at the party and the mother does not know who raped her, it would not be possible to identify the father, even if it were appropriate to notify him in the circumstances.
In respect of the mother’s husband and the wider family, the court applied the factors outlined in Re A, B & C [2020] EWCA Civ 41.
The judge then considered the other key factors identified in Re A, B & C [2020] EWCA Civ 41 in turn. Of particular note was the court’s consideration of parental responsibility.
As to parental responsibility, the court accepted that the mother’s husband had parental responsibility. The judge noted that “compelling reasons” are typically required where a biological father with parental responsibility is to be excluded; this case was treated as different because the husband, although having parental responsibility by marriage, was not the biological father. In this case, the court considered it relevant that he was not the biological father, which placed the case in a different category from one in which he were the biological father. The court also accepted the mother’s evidence that, given the circumstances of the conception, cultural stigma in Country Z would lead the husband and his family to reject D.
Having considered all relevant factors, the court determined that, given the cultural stigma in Country Z and the absence of a relationship between the extended family and the husband, it was appropriate that none of the extended family should be notified. The court also relied on the severe likely impact on the mother (including mental health risks), the unrealistic prospect of a family placement, the durability of confidentiality, and the risk of delay/destabilisation to D’s placement.
Conclusion
Practitioners should note that the husband will still be considered to have parental responsibility where he is married to the mother, in circumstances where he is not the biological father. However, in this case the court considered the fact that he was not the father was relevant to how his parental responsibility was analysed as a factor to his notification.
Additionally, the court placed weight on the cultural stigma and the absence of a relationship before forming the conclusion that the family should not be notified.
The case stands as a strong example of the court’s approach to the factors set out in Re A, B & C [2020] EWCA Civ 41.
Adoption Order: Setting Aside
In the matter of X and Y (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside) [2026] UKSC 13
The court considered whether any jurisdiction exists to set aside a validly made adoption order other than by appeal.
Facts
X and Y were placed with the adoptive mother (AM) in 2012. The adoption order was made in May 2013. X and Y are siblings. They maintained contact with their birth mother (BM) which was supported by AM.
In 2021, X and Y left AM’s home and moved to live with BM. In 2022, X left BM’s home to live with their natural father.
The local authority issued care proceedings in February 2023 on the basis that both children were beyond parental control. The care proceedings ended with Child Arrangements Orders for X to live with her natural father and for Y to live with BM.
Notably, by the time of the Supreme Court hearing X and Y were no longer children; however, when the High Court heard the application in April 2023 they were 17 and 16 and found Gillick competent.
Legislative Framework
The court set out the ACA 2002 scheme and its consequences (paras 11–35, 46–67), and later addressed permanence and policy (section 8, paras 89–127)The Judgment provides a detailed analysis of the full regulatory scheme, including the legislative scheme for placement orders (paragraphs 16–20) and the issues that the court must consider before making an adoption order (paragraphs 11–15). These sections will be well known to practitioners.
The court then dealt with the consequences of an adoption order, in particular section 46(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA 2002), which states that the making of an adoption order operates to extinguish the parental responsibility which any person other than the adopter or adopters has immediately before the making of the order.
The court noted section 67, under which an adopted person is treated as if born to the adopters, and, subject to limited exceptions, is treated in law as not being the child of any other person.
The court also considered that in section 55(1) of ACA 2002: where any child adopted by one natural parent as a sole adoptive parent subsequently becomes a legitimated person on the marriage or civil partnership of the natural parents, the court by which the adoption order was made may revoke the order. This legitimation provision is the sole statutory ground for revocation, alongside the separate mechanism whereby a subsequent adoption revokes an earlier order under section 46(5).
The judgment notes that, unlike adoption orders, special guardianship orders may be varied or discharged, reinforcing the contrast in permanence.
The Proceedings
The High Court refused the application (no power to revoke on welfare grounds; name changes allowed). The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there is no first‑instance jurisdiction to set aside a validly made adoption order; the proper route where there is an appealable error is an appeal out of time.
In the absence of a clear statutory mechanism to revoke a validly made adoption order, the appeal to the Supreme Court depended on the argument that the court has an inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to revoke in circumstances of pressing need (paragraph 46). It was argued on behalf of AM that there was pressing need, as Y was trapped in an identity that she had totally rejected. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding there is and never was a parens patriae power to revoke a valid adoption order; any such power would impermissibly side‑step and circumvent the comprehensive statutory scheme of the ACA 2002.
The Court reaffirmed Re B as controlling authority that there is no inherent jurisdiction to set aside a validly made adoption order, even in exceptional circumstances.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court considered that it was a unique feature of an adoption order that it was fixed and permanent, and that there were valid welfare and public policy reasons for this which were stated at paragraphs 28-31 and 126(a) to (c).
The Supreme Court held that it was clear that ACA 2002 sets out the status of the adopted person and that there is no power under the High Court’s Jurisdiction to revoke a properly made adoption order.
