Re E (A Child) (Special Guardianship Order: Public Law Proceedings) [2026] EWCA Civ 1167
Introduction
This case concerned an appeal by the mother (‘M’) and maternal grandmother (‘MGM’) against a Special Guardianship Order made on 4 February 2026. It raises the question of what approach the court should adopt when making an SGO at the conclusion of care proceedings when the options are either returning the child to live with their family or for the child to remain living with a local authority foster carer pursuant to an SGO.
The appeals were allowed and it was held by the Court of Appeal that the approach of the first instance judge was flawed in applying a simple welfare balance, rather the judge should have considered the issue of proportionality and determined the threshold criteria as set out in section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989.
Summary of background
E, born in March 2020, was previously subject to care proceedings which concluded in July 2021 with an SGO being granted to the MGM. E returned to live with M and the MGM in September 2021. In March 2024, following a referral made to the local authority by someone said to be friend of the MGM raising a number of very serious allegations (largely disputed by M and the MGM and not pursued by the LA at the final hearing), E was removed from the family home. The second set of care proceedings commenced on 14 March 2024 with E placed in foster care under an interim care order.
This placement came to an end in August 2024 when the foster carer was arrested for drink driving and told the police during their interview that she had left E alone at home. E was then placed with her current foster carer who she had been living with for almost 18 months at the time of the final hearing. Regular contact was taking place with M and the MGM. In August 2025 the foster carer confirmed she wished to be appointed as E’s special guardian and a positive assessment was completed in October 2025.
The final amended threshold document, which was significantly more limited to the initial document prepared at the commencement of the proceedings, relied on potential risks to E arising from M’s ill-health, exposure to arguments between M and the MGM, M resorting to inappropriate forms of discipline for E such as shouting, name calling and biting on one occasion, and the MGM between 10 – 12 March 2024 leaving E in M’s sole care at a time when M was struggling, as noticed by the MGM who was aware that M had bitten E a few days before.
A psychiatric report (as well as an addendum) was completed of M alongside a parenting report in 2024. These assessments were therefore over 18 months old by the time of the final hearing, however two letters had been provided from M’s mental health worker in August and December 2025. The letters noted that the mother had been engaging well, shown commendable progress, there had been no concerns in regarding her mental state in over three months and she had been discharged from mental health services. While the ISW considered M was not in a position to safely care for E in the short term, it was commented in terms of her longer-term assessment that: “I am unable to comment confidently about her ability to meet [E’s] needs in the long term. This is because I consider that her challenges can be addressed – her parenting challenges can be addressed through an appropriate parenting course whilst her mental health needs can be addressed through appropriate treatment and therapy. If these issues were to be effectively addressed, then this could mean in the long term she is able to adequately meet [E’s] needs.” Despite this, it was said that the social worker accepted in her oral evidence the LA had ruled out the mother as a longer-term carer in June/ July 2024.
Various parenting assessments were completed of the MGM which noted that the MGM has the capability to adequately care for E on her own, with professional support in place, but raised concerns about M’s mental health and their relationship which poses a risk to E’s safety. The final addendum did not recommend E returning to the MGM’s care “at this stage.” A further assessment completed by a second ISW in May 2025 was substantially more negative and echoed these earlier concerns.
The LA’s care plan, supported by the CG, was for an SGO to be made in favour of the foster carer and contact to be reduced to six times per year. M and the MGM both sought either the return of E to their sole care, or alternatively, joint care with the other. Both indicated they would agree to a supervision order. M’s third preference was for E to be placed in the MGM’s sole care and, if all those options were refused, both M and the MGM sought for E to remain with the foster carer under a care order rather than an SGO.
The judgment
The first instance judge delivered an oral judgment on 3 February 2026 after a five-day final hearing where the court heard oral evidence from M, the MGM, both ISW’s, a LA social worker, the foster carer, the foster carer’s assessor and the CG.
The judge summarised the law as follows:
“[23] My paramount consideration under s.1 of the Children Act 1989 must be [E’s] welfare. In determining any question with respect to the upbringing of the child, the court’s task is to decide which course will best serve the interests of the child’s welfare. When doing so, the court must take into account all the particular circumstances relevant to that child. However, in the end the court has the single question to determine, namely what is best for the welfare of the child. There is no natural parent presumption in either private law or public law. In order to determine the single question of what is best for the welfare of the child the court must conduct a balancing exercise in which each of the competing options is weighed up against the others with the positives and negatives of each option being given due weight in the balance. The judicial exercise should not be a linear exercise whereby each option other than the most draconian is looked at in isolation. S.1(2) of the Children Act expressly states a general principle that any delay in determining any question with regard to the upbringing of the child is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child. The court must have regard to the Welfare Checklist in s.1(3) of the Children Act.”
The judge then structured his analysis by reference to the welfare checklist. Critically, he did not consider it necessary to address the issue of proportionality, nor address the issue of threshold, stating: “I did not consider the section 31 threshold expressly in my judgment because I not think it necessary or appropriate to make an order under section 31. I did, however, consider harm and the likelihood of harm.”
The judge went on to set out the ‘pros and cons’ of placement with the MGM, M or both and ‘pros and cons’ of continuing E’s placement with the foster carer. The ultimate conclusion was that: “[142]…taking [E’s] welfare as my paramount consideration, it is in her best interests to remain in her current placement under a special guardianship order. I do not believe that [E’s] best interests would be served by a return to the care of her mother and maternal grandmother even if they were provided with support under a supervision order. The risk of [E] suffering significant emotional harm firstly as a result of the move, secondly while living in the care of her mother and grandmother, and thirdly as a result of the possible breakdown of that placement is too great.”
The appeal
The grounds of appeal raised a number of issues but, as set out by the court, the core issue to be determined was whether: “the judge misdirected [himself] on the law by deciding it was not necessary to apply the s.31 threshold criteria, to establish the factual matrix at the relevant date, or follow judicial guidance in case law relating to risk and the welfare and proportionality evaluations as the LA was not seeking a public law order.” [7]
The correct approach
The court considered that both the context of the proceedings and the intrusive nature of the proposed order meant the court should adopt broadly the same approach that would be taken when making a care order.
In reaching this conclusion the court considered the proposed order in this case was in the same category of case as Re H-W (where a care order was made for three children with long-term placement in separate foster homes). In Re H-W it was said that the intrusive nature of the proposed order in that case meant that:
“The principles set out in In Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33, [2013] 1 WLR 1911) as to necessity and proportionality clearly apply, mutatis mutandis, also to this kind of case”.
Lord Justice Moylan explained that while, as a matter of law, threshold did not apply as the court did not make a care or supervision order: “I consider that the court should typically determine whether the threshold criteria under s. 31(2) of the CA1989 Act have been established before deciding whether to make an SGO at the conclusion of care proceedings. I say, typically, because there may well be cases where such a course is neither necessary nor appropriate due to the particular circumstances of that case. Although, as explained below, I consider that in the circumstances of this case the court should have done so.” [77]
In summary, the court’s reasons were as follows:
- It is only at the conclusion of the hearing that the court will be determining what order to make, and when the MGM and M indicated they would accept a supervision order, the court would need to determine whether the threshold criteria were established in order to properly assess those options. [78]
- The purpose of the threshold criteria is to protect the child and family from unwarranted state interference. Given the making of an SGO as in the present case can be described as a significant state interference (for example with the special guardian exercising parental responsibility to the exclusion of any other person with parental responsibility) and an “intrusive” order – the court’s approach needs to reflect these elements. As such, “adopting the same or a similar approach to that required by s. 31 would serve to ensure that the court properly recognised the significant effect of the proposed order and sufficiently analysed whether it was necessary and proportionate.” [80]
- Adopting this approach serves to ensure the court’s analysis and determination was founded on a sufficient factual basis, particularly in respect of the issue and level of harm a child has suffered or is likely to suffer [81]. While harm is a relevant factor in the welfare checklist, adopting the threshold approach would “properly reflect the significant, and intrusive, effect of the proposed order and that the exercise in which the court is engaged is more than a simple welfare balancing exercise.” [82] The judgment referred to the explanation of the purpose of making threshold findings, as set out in Re B [2022] and considered, by analogy, “it is a sound route for determining the issue of harm in this context as well.”
- Finally, this approach would “help ensure that the court properly addresses in its judgment one of the key elements, as referred to by Peter Jackson LJ in Re B [2022], at [59(6)], namely making “findings of fact about any disputed matters that are significant for the decision”. [83]
The court’s conclusion was described as resting “significantly on the need for the court to properly to address the necessity and proportionality of the type of order which the court made in this case” [84]. Referring again to Re H-W, the court described the orders in that case as “no more significant in their effect than the SGO which was made in the present case” and set out at [85] the paragraphs of the Re H-W judgment dealing with the principles of necessity and proportionality which “should apply equally in the circumstances of the present case.”
Further reference was made to the case of Re A (Special Guardianship: Competing Applicants) [2018] EWCA Civ 2240, [2019] 1 FLR 687 which identified the requirement that the court undertake a sufficient proportionality evaluation when deciding whether to grant an SGO to foster carers in care proceedings. The appeal in Re A was allowed as the judge had “failed to undertake [an adequate] proportionality evaluation of the necessity of State interference with the child’s rights under Art 8 of the [ECHR] and in particular whether placement outside his birth family was proportionate to his welfare needs”. [88]
Conclusion
The court concluded that the first instance judge’s approach was flawed, allowed both M and the MGM’s appeals and remitted the matter for a rehearing [91] – [92]:
“First, I consider that the judge should have determined whether, and if so how, the threshold criteria were established, which would have included determining the matters relied on by the Local Authority in its final threshold document. This is in part because the care options which required analysis and determination included the making of a supervision order as well as, on the mother’s and the MGM’s respective cases, a care order. It is, however, also because this should have been included as part of the structure of the judgment so as properly to reflect that the court was determining care.
Secondly, I consider that the court was required to apply the conventional and well established principles which apply when the court is deciding whether to remove a child from their family which include whether the order which the court is proposing to make is necessary and proportionate. This, again, was required so as properly to reflect the fact that the court was determining care proceedings and that the order being sought was an SGO in favour of a foster carer, an “intrusive” form of order which, to quote again from H-W, “has consequences almost as far-reaching” as an adoption order and certainly not less than those of many care orders.”
While the court stated it was not necessary to determine the other elements of the appeals, the court considered there was “considerable force in many of them” [93], particularly the mother having not been assessed since 2024 and the need for a proper analysis of the risks of E returning to M and/or the MGM’s care based on findings.
Re Mustafa (A Child) [2026] EWHC 2159 (Fam)
Introduction
On 12 August 2026 the High Court handed down its decision in the case of Mustafa, where the Local Authority sought to withdraw their application made on 4 June 2026 for an extension of a DOLs order in respect of a 15-year-old child.
As acknowledged at the outset of the judgment, this case raises the issue of the application of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland of a devolution issue under paragraph 34 of Schedule 10 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 [2026] UKSC 16, [2026] 2 WLR 1087 (hereinafter ‘AGNI’), which overruled Surrey County Council v P; Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] AC 896 (hereinafter ‘Cheshire West’). It is therefore a significant decision, understood to be the first reported case concerning DOLs for children post-AGNI.
Facts
Mustafa is a 15-year-old child with Prader Willi syndrome, developmental delay and additional learning needs. Since 2021 he had been residing full time in a residential school, a regulated placement. Mustafa was made subject to a care order to the LB of Brent in 2022 and a DOLs order was made on 17 June 2025. This provided for the following restrictions:
- External doors to be kept locked and the key out of Mustafa’s access to prevent him from absconding
- Kitchen door locked at night times
- 1:1 care support at all times within the home and community
- 2:1 support permitted when assessed as necessary, including in the community
- All kitchen tools/ sharp tools kept out of reach and used only under supervision
- Care support for administration of medicines to safeguard his health
- Constant supervision to ensure his personal care needs are met in a safe manner
The LA, and the Guardian agreeing, described ‘the concrete situation’ for Mustafa as follows:
- Mustafa was “integrated” into his placement rather than “isolated” in it
- He “consistently described himself as happy”, has never expressed a wish to leave the placement and asked to move elsewhere
- The effect of the arrangements on Mustafa is “overwhelmingly positive” – he has made significant progress, enjoys a full range of activities, has meaningful family contact and returns back to the placement after home visits without difficulty
- While certain restrictions remain in place, “the manner in which the arrangements are implemented is also relevant”, for example staff seek to provide a nurturing environment, the placement operates a restraint reduction plan seeking to reduce restrictions where possible and physical intervention is a last resort
The LA submitted that ‘valid consent’ was a critical feature of the case. It was argued that Mustafa clearly meets the threshold of possessing a sufficient level of awareness and understanding to know whether he is happy or unhappy with his living arrangements and to communicate that view. It was said that:
- Mustafa is able to identify what he likes about the school, describes relationships and discuss activities he enjoys, express a view regarding family contact and specifically requesting additional overnight stays
- Importantly, Mustafa “is not merely acquiescent” – he routinely expresses preferences, disagrees with decisions, negotiates and communicates dissatisfaction when he doesn’t agree
- The significance of Mustafa’s “repeated and consistent statements” that he likes the school cannot be understated
- Arrangements are protective and supportive in nature
- Mustafa understands in broad terms why staff provide support and that intervention may be required when there is a risk of harm
- There is no evidence suggesting medication is used in a way that suppresses Mustafa’s ability to express his wishes and feelings
Regarding the ‘normality of Mustafa’s circumstances’ it was said by the LA that Mustafa’s care arrangements must be assessed in the context of his enduring disabilities and very significant support needs. The restrictions were “not arbitrary” imposed on an “unwilling child”, rather practical measures to enable him to live safely and, when considered in the context of Mustafa’s own circumstances, represent “ordinary and necessary features of the specialist care package” he required.
The LA submitted “that considering Mustafa’s concrete situation as a whole, and applying the multifactorial test mandated by [AGNI], Mustafa is not deprived of his liberty.” [8]
The CG, who rather unusually opposed the withdrawal of the application for a DOLs order, agreed with the facts as set out by the LA. However, it was further observed that Mustafa required a high level of structure, routine support and supervision, there had been 48 recorded in just under a year and Mustafa’s behaviour continues to necessitate the occasional use of RPI. While Mustafa said he felt “fine” about the use of restraint and appeared to understand the reasons for it he had said at a previous review that he does not like it.
Overall, while the CG agreed with the LA that the majority of the restrictions do not amount to coercion, and that Mustafa consents to the restrictions and understands they are there to keep him safe, “it remains difficult to know whether this is compliance by Mustafa rather than valid consent.” Furthermore, the CG believed the frequency of restraint, using physical intervention to manage Mustafa’s behaviour approximately every 9-10 days, represents a regular pattern which, “combined with the increase in the duration and intensity of the incidents, may lean to a necessity to renew the DOL Order.”
Law
The judge set out Article 5(1) of the ECHR and the relevant principles in determining whether there is a deprivation of liberty, as set out by the Supreme Court in AGNI as follows at [53]:
“(i) The starting point in assessing whether someone has been deprived of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is the specific situation of the individual concerned, and the assessment is multifactorial, with account taken of a whole range of factors including the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question… The judgments of the European court show that no single factor is determinative.
(ii) In addition to the objective element of confinement in a restricted space for a significant period, an individual will only be considered to be deprived of liberty if, as an additional subjective element, they have not validly consented to the confinement in question… Valid consent is therefore a powerful factor in the assessment. It is an autonomous concept and not to be equated with the concepts of consent for the purpose of waiver of rights under the Convention or of legal capacity in domestic law. The fact that an individual lacks legal capacity to decide on their living and care arrangements does not necessarily mean that they are de facto unable to understand and consent to those arrangements in a manner that prevents those arrangements from becoming a deprivation of liberty… On the contrary, an individual without legal capacity under domestic law, but who is conscious of their environment and has a basic understanding of their living circumstances so that they can express their view about their situation, who manifests their acceptance of the situation they are in, should have their opinion respected when an assessment is made of whether they are deprived of liberty under article 5.
(iii) Although the objective and subjective elements of deprivation of liberty are often considered sequentially by the European court in its assessment of an applicant’s specific situation, there is an overlap. The requirement to take account of the ‘type’ and ‘effects and manner of implementation’ of the measure in question means that the assessment of the objective element can take account of the specific context and circumstances of restrictive measures that are different from the paradigm of confinement in a cell.
(iv) The approach of the European court means that the effect of restrictions on an individual, including their compliance and the lack of objection if they are capable of objecting or giving tacit agreement, is relevant in assessing the objective element of confinement. The relative normality of the placement is also a relevant factor in this assessment. Similarly, in situations that are far from the paradigm of confinement in a cell, the purpose for which a measure has been taken is a factor to be considered.
(v) The European court has recognised that the process of assessing whether there has been a deprivation of liberty is no easy task in some contexts and may give rise to difficulties, especially in borderline or marginal cases. Equally, it may sometimes be difficult to ascertain the true feelings or preferences of vulnerable individuals who do not have mental capacity to decide on their living arrangements. The approach should be practical and realistic. Where there is serious doubt, no inference of valid consent should be drawn.”
Decision
It was concluded by the court that, the overruling of Cheshire West, provides an answer to the question that: “A child who is not Gillick competent may nonetheless have sufficient understanding for their views to be relevant as to whether they consent to aspects of deprivation of their liberty.” [39]
Regarding the issue of whether Mustafa’s apparent consent was, as said by the CG, “compliance by Mustafa rather than valid consent” and “likely to be insecure, not of an enduring nature and likely to be revised and retracted” the court considered this observation overlooked the fact that schools are “sometimes entitled to use physical restraint on children regardless of the child’s wishes” [40]. This power was considered in FXS (through his father and litigation friend JLM) v Mulberry Bush Organisation Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 415, [2026] 3 WLR 147, which highlighted the common law powers of schools within section 93 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006. As such, even if Mustafa were to withdraw his consent, the school still has the power to restrain him under their common law powers therefore there will be no breach of Article 5(1).
Overall, therefore, the judge concluded:
“When I stand back at look at all the factors relevant to the assessment as to whether there is a deprivation of liberty, in my judgment there is no deprivation of liberty. Mustafa is, as the Guardian sets out at length, generally happy in his placement. Where the school uses physical restraint, it either has Mustafa’s consent or it is entitled to use restraint under its common law powers. Either way, there is no deprivation of liberty such as to give rise to a violation of Article 5(1). An extension of the DOLs order is therefore neither necessary nor proportionate and I refuse to grant one.” [14]
The judgment also briefly considered a procedural issue of whether the inherent jurisdiction would be available in the absence of an application. The court noted this question “must await determination until it is relevant” [17] but the CG cannot apply for legal aid to act as Mustafa’s litigation friend [CPR 21.2: Re SW and TW (Children: Human Rights Claim: Procedure) 2017 EWHC 450) (Fam)]. The CG could however invite the Official Solicitor, or another interested person (such as a parent), to seek declaratory relief in the County Court or the High Court. This declaration “would be to the effect that the local authority was depriving the child of their liberty and that such deprivation would be unlawful unless and until the local authority obtains a DOLs order.” [18]
Conclusion
This judgment clearly sets out that post-AGNI a child does not need to be considered Gillick competent in order to give valid consent and the multifactorial assessment now applies, rather than the “acid test” as set out in Cheshire West. The reference to a school’s common law powers is an interesting point to consider, and it is apparent that each individual child’s circumstances will be highly relevant. Given there has been significantly more limited focus so far on the implications of AGNI for children, compared with adults, this is an important decision and practitioners should look out for what further developments arise in the upcoming months.

