Private Children Law Case Update – Summer 2026

FAZ v MAZ [2026] EWFC 131

This judgment of Poole J concerned allegations of sexual abuse in private law children proceedings.

At the outset Poole J observed, expectedly, that where the court has to determine allegations of sexual abuse of a child by a parent “the stakes are high” [§1].

Factual background

The parties were the parents of AZ, who was 14 at the time of judgment. They had been in a relationship for 18 years, having married in 2008 and separated in 2015. A child arrangements order had been made by consent in September 2016 providing for AZ to live with her mother and spend time with her father. Those arrangements continued for more than seven years.

All contact between AZ and her father stopped in late 2023. In December 2023, a few days after what appeared to have been a happy evening with her father and his partner, AZ reported at school that she had suicidal thoughts and found her father to be “draining”. She did not want to spend time with him over Christmas as had been planned and referred to earlier incidents which she said made her feel unsafe. The mother then stopped all contact between AZ and the father.

According to the mother, in January 2024 AZ told her that when staying with the father he had entered her bed and touched her bottom. The mother contacted the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub. AZ later gave a police interview in which she repeated the allegation that the father had touched her bottom over her pyjamas and alleged that on two occasions his fingers had touched around her genitals over her clothing. The father was interviewed by police in February 2024 and in July 2024 they decided to take no further action.

Procedural background 

The father applied in August 2024 to vary the existing child arrangements order to reinstate his relationship with AZ and for the instruction of a clinical psychologist to undertake a global psychological assessment of the family. In November 2024 the mother applied to vary the order so that there would be no contact between the father and AZ and sought a s91(14) barring order.

The mother put forward allegations of physical, emotional and sexual abuse. Poole J decided that only the sexual abuse allegations needed to be determined at a fact-finding hearing. The allegations were that the father had entered AZ’s bedroom and sniffed her underwear, that he had entered her bedroom, removed his clothes except for boxer shorts, got into her bed and placed his hand on her bottom, and that he had placed his hand over AZ’s genitals.

At the outset of the fact-finding hearing, the mother withdrew the first allegation, accepting that the father had been doing no more than sorting laundry. During the trial she decided to no longer pursue the remaining allegations. Poole J indicated that “findings of fact were for the court” [§2] and proceeded to give judgment accordingly.

The law

Poole J summarised the familiar principles applicable to a fact-finding exercise in private law proceedings [§19]. The burden of proof lies on the person inviting the court to make the findings and there is no obligation on the respondent to prove an alternative explanation [§19.1]. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities and the law applies a binary approach, simply that if the threshold is met the fact is proved [§19.2].

Poole J reminded himself of Re P [2019] EWFC 27 and the need for caution when considering allegations of sexual abuse made by children [§20]. In particular, that children can be suggestible, that memory can be influenced by the environment in which recall is invited, and that children can give sincere and emotional accounts of events which did not in fact happen [ibid].

Outcome

The allegations of sexual abuse were not proved. Poole J found that the father had not sexually abused AZ and that this should be made known to all relevant professionals [§93].

The father accepted that he had sometimes got into AZ’s bed at her invitation to comfort her and help her get to sleep [§8]. Poole J found that the father did not intentionally touch AZ’s bottom in bed. If his hand did touch her bottom, it did so when he was asleep. The allegation that he had placed his hand over AZ’s genitals was not proved [ibid].

The court did not find that the mother had deliberately concocted the allegations or instructed AZ what to say [§91]. However, Poole J found that the mother’s anxieties and distrust of the father had caused her to adopt a perspective on past events which was “untethered from reality” [ibid]. She viewed the father as an abuser and, in doing so, influenced AZ [ibid]. The court found that by the time of the police interview AZ was reconsidering what had happened “through the lens of abuse” [§92]. She had started to imagine details which had not happened including the placement of the father’s fingers [ibid].

Poole J was also satisfied that the mother’s anxieties, over-protectiveness and distrust had caused her to view concerns expressed by AZ as evidence of abuse, to escalate concerns to professionals, sometimes to exaggerate or embellish information, to isolate AZ from the father and his partner, and to cause AZ to undergo therapy for trauma which was at least partly directed to sexual abuse by her father which did not happen [§94.1]. The mother’s conduct had influenced AZ and caused her to reframe past events as examples of sexual abuse when they were not [ibid].

Commentary

Poole J described the cessation of contact and the provision of therapy as having been on a “false premise” [§2] and this case profoundly illustrates the serious impact of allegations before determination of fact. The distinction made by the court however is important: Poole J did not find that the mother had invented the allegations or told AZ what to say [§91] but did find that her anxiety, over-protectiveness and distrust of the father had encouraged and reinforced a false narrative [§§91, 94.3].

The consequences were plainly serious. AZ had no contact with her father, his partner or her paternal grandmother for over two years [§2]. She had also been receiving therapy for complex PTSD symptoms, in part on the basis that she had suffered sexual abuse by her father [ibid]. Poole J found that the mother’s conduct had been emotionally and psychologically harmful to AZ and that it would take “a great deal of work and commitment” to undo that harm, if it could ever be repaired [§96].

The judgment is also a reminder that fact-finding is a matter for the court and not the parties. The mother’s decision not to pursue the allegations did not prevent the court from determining whether they were proved [§2]. That was particularly important because AZ had been receiving therapy on a factual basis which the court rejected [§§2, 93]. In that vein, practitioners should note the practical importance of the court’s direction that the findings should be made known to relevant professionals [§93]. The child, the parents and the professionals working with the family will need a clear factual foundation for any reparative work that follows [§10].

Re J, Re M and Re P (Loss of Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344

This Court of Appeal judgment concerned three conjoined appeals about birth certificates where there had been mistake, misrepresentation or uncertainty as to paternity.

The appeals addressed whether a person registered as “father” on a child’s birth certificate could acquire parental responsibility by virtue of that registration where he was not, or could not be proved to be, the child’s biological father.

Background

In Re J, AJ and MJ had been in a relationship when MJ became pregnant. J was born in 2020 and the couple registered the birth together naming AJ as J’s father. AJ believed that he was J’s biological father. Two years later, after the relationship had ended, MJ informed AJ that he might not be J’s father. DNA testing subsequently established that another man was J’s biological father. AJ had always considered himself to be J’s father and wished to continue in a parental relationship with him.

In Re M, M was conceived after MM and AM purchased sperm online from an anonymous donor. AM was named as M’s father on the birth certificate. He said that he had not appreciated that by not using a licensed fertility clinic he might not acquire legal status in relation to a child conceived using donor sperm. DNA testing confirmed that AM was not M’s biological father. The issue arose in care proceedings, where the local authority sought a declaration that AM was not M’s father and an order terminating any parental responsibility he might have. The judge below had also found that AM had been dishonest over a prolonged period by holding himself out as M’s genetic father.

Re P involved a more unusual factual matrix. P’s father was either TP1 or TP2, who were identical twin brothers. DNA testing could not establish which of them was P’s biological father. The judge below found that each had a 50% chance of being the father, but neither was proved to be so on the balance of probabilities. TP1 was named as father on P’s birth certificate.

Decision

The Court of Appeal held that “father” in the Children Act 1989 means the biological or genetic father. It does not extend to a person who has acted as a psychological or social father [§80].

The Court further held that parental responsibility under s4 Children Act 1989 is only acquired by registration where two requirements are both satisfied: the person must be the child’s biological father and he must be registered as father on the birth certificate [§80].

A person who is wrongly registered as father does not acquire parental responsibility by virtue of that registration. The issue is therefore not whether parental responsibility is later lost or terminated following a declaration of non-parentage – it never arose in the first place [§81].

In Re J, the decision of Debra Powell KC was upheld. The Court of Appeal held that the correct analysis was not that AJ’s parental responsibility was void ab initio, but that it had never arisen because he was not J’s father [§81].

In Re M, the central analysis of HHJ Tucker was also upheld. AM was not M’s biological father and did not acquire parental responsibility by being named on the birth certificate [§82].

Re P required separate consideration. Neither TP1 nor TP2 could prove that he was P’s biological father. As neither could establish paternity, neither was treated as P’s father for the purposes of the Children Act 1989 [§86]. However, the Court of Appeal could not make a declaration that TP1 was not P’s father because there remained a 50% chance that he was. The court therefore refused to make a declaration of non-parentage under s55A Family Law Act 1986 [§§89-93]. The Court did, however, consider it necessary to resolve the uncertainty as to parental responsibility. It held that any parental responsibility TP1 may have acquired by registration should cease under s4(2A) Children Act 1989 [§§96-98].

Discussion

The judgment is significant because it confirms that registration alone is not enough to confer parental responsibility on a non-biological father. A person may have been named on a birth certificate and treated by others as having parental responsibility. However, if he is not the child’s biological father, and has no other legal route to parental responsibility, registration will not assist him. The status of fatherhood is not created by the birth certificate [§50].

The judgment also distinguishes between biological parenthood, registration and parental responsibility. These concepts often overlap in practice but they are not the same. Registration may be evidence of parentage, but it is not conclusive and does not create legal fatherhood.

The Court of Appeal did however recognise that psychological or social parenthood may still matter. Where a person has become a psychological or social parent to a child, their role may be reflected through a child arrangements order and, where appropriate, the attribution of parental responsibility under s12 Children Act 1989 [§83].

Re Pis particularly important on uncertainty. It demonstrates the difference between a fact not being proved and the opposite fact being proved. TP1 could not prove that he was P’s father which did not mean the court could positively declare that he was not P’s father. The court therefore refused to alter the birth registration by making a declaration of non-parentage, but still acted to remove the uncertainty about parental responsibility.

The judgment also identifies a practical issue in cases involving a risk of abduction. Where there is uncertainty as to paternity, a person registered as father may need to seek protective s8 orders and, if justified, parental responsibility under s12 Children Act 1989 [§84].

The case is essential reading where there has been mistake, misrepresentation or uncertainty on a birth certificate. It confirms that a person wrongly registered as father does not acquire parental responsibility by registration and that any social or psychological parenting role must be secured by another legal route.