So here we are. Judgment Day. The Court of Appeal has, today, handed down judgment in Mazur [2026] EWCA Civ 369 and decisively addressed the issue of delegation in relation to the “conduct of litigation” under the Legal Services Act 2007. The appeal resolves the uncertainty created by the High Court’s earlier decision and restores a position far closer to everyday litigation practice.
The central issue
At its core, the appeal concerned the meaning of the phrases “carry on” and “the conduct of litigation”. In particular, a question for the Court was whether non-authorised individuals working within firms could perform litigation tasks under supervision without committing a criminal offence.
The Court’s key conclusion – they can
The Court of Appeal (Birss LJ giving the leading judgment) held in clear terms:
“An unauthorised person can lawfully perform any tasks, which are within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual… The authorised individual… is the person carrying on the conduct of litigation. The unauthorised person is not… and does not commit an offence.” (para 25)
This represents a decisive rejection of the restrictive approach adopted by the High Court. The judgment, however, turns on an important distinction:
“The ordinary meaning of the words: ‘conduct of litigation’ refer to the tasks to be undertaken, whilst the words ‘carry on’ refer to direction and control of, and responsibility for, those tasks.” (para 21)
In other words, the Legal Services Act separates:
- the performance of litigation tasks, and
- the responsibility for those tasks
Only the latter determines who is “conducting” litigation for the purposes of the Act.
Rejection of the High Court’s approach
The Court of Appeal rejected the distinction drawn by the High Court between “assisting” and “conducting under supervision”:
“The role of an unauthorised person… is not limited merely to assisting or supporting… and the distinction… between (a) supporting (or assisting) and (b) conducting litigation under supervision was not correct.” (para 27)
“It is not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision…” (para 27)
The Court emphasised that delegation is both lawful and longstanding:
“Before the 2007 Act, there was a widespread, general and well-regulated practice of delegation by solicitors to unqualified individuals” (para 19)
“The 2007 Act… was not intended to and did not make a significant change…” (para 20)
Crucially, delegation does not displace professional responsibility:
“This practice of delegation did not absolve solicitors of their professional responsibilities… Nor did it undermine… duties to the court.” (para 19)
No rigid requirement of prior approval
A central plank of the respondents’ case — that authorised persons must approve each step before it is taken — was rejected:
“The degree of prior approval contended for by the Law Society and SRA is not required by the 2007 Act.” (para 25)
Instead, supervision is flexible and context-dependent:
“In some circumstances the degree of appropriate control and supervision will be high… In other… circumstances, a lower level… will be required.” (para 25)
“It may be sufficient… to conduct regular meetings… and to sample their work.” (para 25)
Clarification of prior authority
The Court also clarified the scope of recent authority, particularly Baxter v Doble:
“These cases are entirely distinguishable… where an authorised individual seeks to delegate tasks…” (para 22)
“Baxter… did not consider the issue of an unauthorised person performing tasks for… an authorised individual…” (para 24)
No exhaustive definition
Despite the desire for certainty, the Court declined to produce a closed list of what constitutes the conduct of litigation noting:
“It is simply not possible to provide a comprehensive list of all those tasks…” (para 29)
Practical implications
The judgment restores a workable and familiar position. Litigation tasks — including steps such as issuing proceedings — may be carried out by non-authorised staff, provided that an authorised individual:
- retains responsibility, and
- maintains appropriate supervision
As the Court recognised, the contrary interpretation would have had striking consequences:
“It… highlighted how many solicitors had… potentially [been] committing a criminal offence…” (para 11)
So, who won and who lost?
- CILEX is in my view the decisive winner. Its central submission — that the statutory concept of the “conduct of litigation” separates the performance of tasks from responsibility for them — was adopted in terms. The Court held that an authorised individual remains the person “carrying on” the litigation even where tasks are performed by others on their behalf.
- APIL and the Law Centres Network also fared well. Their emphasis on long-standing professional practice and the practical realities of litigation was reflected in the Court’s conclusion that delegation has always been a “widespread” and accepted feature of the profession and was not altered by the 2007 Act (paras 19–20).
- By contrast, the Law Society and the SRA suffered a clear defeat. Their attempt to draw a bright line between “assisting” and “conducting litigation under supervision” was rejected outright as “not correct” (para 27). Equally, their contention that each step required prior approval from an authorised individual found no support in the statutory scheme (para 25).
- As for Mazur and Stuart, they did not succeed on the law. However, their challenge has had a significant systemic effect. As the Court itself recognised, the decision below had already had “real world impact” (para 3), and the appeal has now produced authoritative clarification for the profession.
Conclusion
The Court’s reasoning can be reduced to a single proposition: Litigation tasks may be delegated; responsibility may not.
In restoring that distinction, the Court has aligned the statutory scheme with the practical realities of modern legal practice, while preserving the central importance of professional accountability.
